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Introduction
The prolonged conflicts today in Iraq and Afghanistan signal that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the other executive agencies lack the capabilities for conducting stability operations. In both conflicts, the United States military forces were able to dominate the enemy in the operation's maneuver phases but were unable to capitalize on that success in the subsequent stabilization phases. The collective inability to seize and exploit the peace highlights the disparity between the stated authorities and responsibilities of the multiple agencies of the US government and their true capacity to fulfill this task. To rectify the problem, experts began to call for an urgent reshaping and rebalancing of organizations across the executive agencies to address the enduring and now exigent strategic requirement for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations.
1
As early as 2004, scholars, pundits, and practitioners alike began to unite in their call for DOD to direct its vast resources and unique expeditionary culture toward stability operations as an emerging strategic requirement. These advocates called upon the DOD to take action on two complementary efforts to close the obvious gap between the civilian and military capacity to conduct stability operations. The first effort urged the DOD to stimulate the development of expeditionary stability capacity through increased cooperation and coordination with the other executive agencies. The second effort called for DOD to create a specialized force for stabilization and reconstruction operations. That effort would require significant more resources than the first. In support of these proposals, a concert of analysts and historians identified the CORDS, the advocates tried to convince defense policymakers that developing a specialized capacity, to conduct stability operations, was a critical DOD strategic requirement.
What these advocates failed to realize, however, was that strategic requirements are only one of the important factors that the Department of Defense must weigh before undertaking resource intensive initiatives. As an agency of the US government, the Department of Defense must navigate a course that addresses the political environment as well as operational requirements. In today's political environment, the DOD must consider the partisan political relationship between the executive and legislative branches along with the impact that a new initiative will have upon the implementation of ongoing programs. The Department must also identify the consequences associated with creating additional resource demands and the effect of the new demands on the budget distribution between existing programs, agencies, and current operations. By considering these inter-related factors along with the strategic requirements, it is possible to understand better the Department of Defense's reluctance to create specialized units for stability and reconstruction operations.
This study is an assessment of the Department of Defense's response to the call to create specialized forces for stability and reconstruction operations. To make an assessment it was necessary first to understand the reason for the call by analyzing the different proposals and the analogy made with the Vietnam-era CORDS program. That analysis revealed that the passage of time has sanitized the memory of CORDS from the political considerations that facilitated its creation. Today, there are significantly more political issues to address before implementing a force development program.
The analysis also exposed the DOD's response to the call for new organizations. The DOD response did not directly prevent creating specialized units for stability operations, but it did delay the serious consideration of those proposals. How DOD embraced the need for stability and reconstruction operations while fending off the creation of specialized units is a story that reveals in bold relief the salient features of congressional defense and budgetary politics.
Calls for a Specialized Stabilization Force
By late 2003, a bevy of scholars and defense pundits began to bemoan the government's failure to conduct effective stabilization and reconstruction programs to secure the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan. While most experts accepted the need for an interagency effort to address these complex problems, they also recognized that only the Department of Defense possessed the requisite resources. As a result, defense analysts began to investigate the creation of specialized forces for stability operations to address the exigent requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The force structure alternatives varied from the simple reorganization of existing units to the creation of separate stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) divisions. Supporters for each of these initiatives identified the strategic requirement to develop such a capability and similar requirements during the Vietnam War that sparked the creation of CORDS.
In November 2003, Dr. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson published a National
Defense University (NDU) report titled, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations that report became the foundation for a variety of recommendations for the creation of a standing specialized force for stabilization and reconstruction operations. In the report, the authors recommended complementing combat forces by reorganizing the existing separate battalions of civil affairs, engineer, military police, medical, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) into a stability and reconstruction brigade structure. The existing two integrated Active Component /National Guard divisional headquarters skeletons, the 7 th Infantry Division and the 24 th Infantry Division, were to support these brigades and assist in their development and administration. The creation of these specialized stability brigades and their subordinate mission tailored task forces was to augment the Army's brigade force structure by providing a dedicated S&R capability. The report's overarching conclusion was that, the US military needs a standing specialized force for stability operations to meet contemporary strategic requirements. Yet, the authors were careful to present a solution that incorporated the resource constraints relevant to the DOD. The report provided the foundation for future studies by government organizations such as the Defense Science Board and the Congressional Budget Office as well as innumerable articles by advocates of a CORDS-like specialized force for stability operations. However, the subsequent studies and articles never fully incorporated the resource constraints on personnel and organizations that were essential elements of the NDU recommendation. Proponents of a specialized S&R force seized upon the exigent strategic requirement, demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the recommendations published in the National Defense University and Defense Science Boards studies to ignite the call for the creation of a specialized stability operations force. The proponents recognized the similar strategic requirement in Vietnam and alluded to the CORDS program as a historical example for DOD to emulate. By doing so, they were accepting a memory of the CORDS program sanitized from the political considerations that facilitated its creation.
CORDS Remembered
The advocates for a specialized S&R organization remember the CORDS program as a presidential initiative that aligned the stability operations of the multiple agencies of the U.S. government in an expeditious and adroit manner. Prior to the establishment of CORDS, the US pacification effort in Vietnam was an ungainly collection of incoherent half-hearted efforts by a group of reluctant executive agencies. No single governmental agency saw stability operations as their primary mission and yet, no organization was willing to allow another agency to secure the authority, responsibility, or resources for the entire program. "Conscious of the importance of political, social, and economic matters to the successful prosecution of the war" 4 President
Johnson identified the pacification effort as a strategic requirement. When the President found that the multiple agencies were slow to react to his identification of stability operations as a strategic requirement, the President took authoritative action. On May 9 1967, President Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum 362 directing therein the integration of the "U.S. Congress that has the knowledge, the capacity, and the potential will to definitively shape or disrupt presidential initiatives.
Significant congressional challenges tend to arise when the parties' identification of existential threats differs from the administrations' or from each other. During the early Cold War period, the threat was unambiguous, undeniable, and growing. The Soviet Union and its use of communist insurgencies dominated national security policy agenda. The administration's defense budget responded directly to this threat by climbing as the intensity of the threat grew and falling as the threat diminished. The Congress acted to increase and decrease the budget in accordance with their perception of the threat but never outside of any range of significance because the threat was always present and lurking behind the Iron Curtain. The Tet-Offensive had a significant psychological impact on the Congress and changed this paradigm. The Congress had deferred to the President and the military but they perceived impending failure in Vietnam and began to challenge the precedent of deference to the executive. The perceived national security failure of the Tet-Offensive drove Congress to increase their organic capability and willingness to intervene in the realm of national defense. 26 Today, congressional perceptions of America's existential threats differ sharply. The lack of a common identifiable existential threat, such as the Soviet Union, leaves Congress to fall back upon their partisan base, predispositions, and perceptions as the directing forces for Congress's intervention in the defense budget. When congressional partisan perceptions differ with the administrations over defense policy, Congress has the incentive to challenge the defense budget request and take steps to adjust it to meet their perceptions. "With such policy differences, a heightened sense of partisanship, and increased military expertise, Congress had now both the will and the way to challenge the administration's defense policy objectives." 
The Commander in Chief Responds
The executive and the DOD responded to the increased congressional intrusion by exercising Presidential discretion "to spend from large, lump-sum accounts and to spend reprogrammed, transferred, emergency, and contingency funds without specific prior appropriation from Congress" 28 "Reprogramming permits funds in an account to be used for different purpose than those contemplated when the funds were appropriated." 29 By using these reprogrammed funds, the President and the DOD are able to bypass congressional oversight and the tedious appropriations process as well as conditional restraints. Congress is reluctant to Defense. Today's executive-legislative relationship is one of legislative conflict. Congress, empowered by its increased institutional expertise, disunited by the perceived lack of a common existential threat, and bifurcated by increased partisanship, now possesses the ways, means, and will to affect the implementation of the President's national security policy. However, the President's contemporary ability to use supplemental and reprogrammed funds to finance national security initiatives and operations has restored executive power. During periods of conflict, the President is able to employ this discretionary spending by harnessing Congress' propensity to avoid accountability in national security matters. In the contemporary defense budgetary environment, DOD now seeks to achieve its institutional goals by exploiting political opportunities created by electoral results and the budget cycle. Successfully achieving force development objectives over a long period requires DOD to prioritize objectives and adjust its financial plans to the two-year election cycle.
Selecting Priorities
The early years of the Global War on Terror created a political environment that favored the Department of Defense. The nation held a unified vision on national security policy due to the 
Responding to Proponents
While defense policy is often a balance between institutional priorities and strategic requirements, major initiatives in the contemporary defense budget environment require DOD to prioritize its efforts or risk significant disruptions in the pursuit of defense department goals. The discrete biennial partisan shifts in the defense budgetary environment force DOD to use "sequential attention" 37 to secure the department's goals while, simultaneously "satisficing" 38 other requirements to delay those initiatives and preserve critical resources. Under this construct, it is possible to understand better DOD's efforts to address and embrace the strategic requirement of stability operations while employing measures to delay the serious consideration for creating a specialized stability force. The Army used a number of tactics to delay opposition to the Army's transformation to modularity. First, the Army simply ignored the proponents calling for a specialized force. As the calls grew, the Army implemented a series of studies to create the perception of action while in reality stalling long enough to secure sequential objectives. When Congress began to actively consider the options for creating a specialized force, DOD and the Army reacted by publishing doctrine and directives to associate the modularity initiative with stability operations. The doctrine and directives also served to define DOD's and the Army's participation in, and integration with, the other executive agencies in stability operations.
The first tactic DOD used to protect the Army's modularity initiative was to ignore the emerging strategic requirement for stability operations and to recommend measures to address it.
As noted earlier, Dr. Hans Binnenedijk and Stuart Johnson published a National Defense
University (NDU) report titled, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.
The report provided a series of modest recommendations for the creation of a standing specialized stabilization force. In the document, the authors recommended reorganizing the existing separate battalions of civil affairs, engineer, military police, medical, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) into a stability and reconstruction brigade structure to complement standing combat forces. 39 While the authors were careful to present a solution cognizant of DOD's resource constraints, the publication's timing gave DOD the opportunity to delay serious consideration of The CBO report strengthened the Army's justification for the transformation to a modular force and temporarily quelled the critics call for the establishment of a specialized force for stability operations. In the report, the CBO considered "eight options for restructuring the Army, each of which would either increase the Army's ability to perform some types of missions or decrease its reliance on the reserve component. The options offer[ed] a broad overview of the general types of policy choices and trade-offs that decision-makers face when considering the size, structure, and capability of any plan for reorganizing the Army."
46 CBO compared the implications of varying three key attributes of the force structure: the overall size of the Army, the distribution between the active and reserve components, and the types of major combat forces along with the associate level of support forces. Although the report contained seven different primary alternatives for the Army's force structure, not including the sub-options, it contained only one primary alternative that discussed the creation of a specialized force for stability operations. Fortunately, for the Army, the CBO's analysis of this alternative was so poor that it effectively countered the previous recommendations to create a specialized force for stability operations.
The alternative titled, Alternative 4-Organize Stabilization and Reconstruction Divisions,
suggests converting "two active Army divisions into dedicated peacekeeping divisions. The S&R divisions showed a marked decrease in combat capacity at the cost of six full combat brigades while never addressing a quantitative or qualitative increase in S&R capacity.
Eliminating two full combat divisions to facilitate the creation of four S&R divisions was completely incongruent with the National Defense University (NDU) report titled Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operation. Yet, the NDU report was the only source cited for the alternative. While a cursory review of the first bullet in the NDU document's conclusion may lead one to believe it recommends reorganizing two combat divisions into stability and reconstruction divisions, a complete reading of the document in no way presents such a resource intensive solution. Rather, the document recommends reorganizing the existing separate battalions of civil affairs, engineer, military police, medical, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) under a stability and reconstruction brigade structure to complement standing combat forces. The NDU document specifically states, "Current forces should be adequate insofar as these same units are performing the S&R in Iraq today, albeit under an ad hoc concept of operations belatedly executed." The executive summary of the report made clear the report did not recommend an adjustment to force structure and emphasized the danger to the program such a proposal would represent. The study emphasized that, "re-organization of an institution typically is fractious and disruptive" 62 and highlighted that reorganization would mandate significant costs in personnel, time, and resources. Furthermore, the report poignantly identified the budgetary reality that the nation "cannot afford to maintain two separate forces; one dedicated to major combat, the other to stability operations." 63 Stability and combat operations are not separate and discreet events rather they are inclusive elements along the spectrum of conflict. 64 Ibid., 4. It is important to note, that internal to the report, the complete phrase is "accelerating Transformation to Stability Operations" not just accelerating transformation. The editorial guidance in this study is apparent both in the introductions and in the memorandums to the Defense Science Board Chairman as well as the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics). These areas highlight initiatives and doctrine already accepted by DOD and eschewed the more confrontational remarks in the study. 65 Ibid., 12.
Directive 3000.05 to prevent unanticipated repercussions from the President's impending National Security Presidential Directive.
DOD Directive 3000.05
The The publication of DODD 3000.05 codified stability operation as an integral element of full-spectrum operations and, therefore, linked stability operations to DOD's ongoing efforts at defense transformation. The document did this by proclaiming stability operations as "a core U.S. divided interests produce. 73 The formalization S/CRS also established an alternate node for the President to "finance national security activities" 74 outside of the purview of the congressional budgetary cycle.
In the early Cold War environment of congressional deference, a presidential initiative of this magnitude would have gained traction just as NSAM 362 did for the CORDS program.
However, in the contemporary budgetary environment, long-term Presidential initiatives depend on a variety of other variables. These variables include the ability of the President's political party to retain control of Congress, secure funding, and gain the time necessary to establish, develop, and institutionalize the initiative. Without such protections, as has already been shown, initiatives are prone to significant budget cuts as the rational that facilitated their creation wanes.
Conclusion
While scholars, pundits, and practitioners alike, clamor for creating a specialized stability force, based on the CORDS model, they failed to understand the constraining dynamics of the defense budgetary environment. In the contemporary US national security environment, implementing new initiatives is dependent upon a number of factors other than pure strategic requirements. While defense policy is always a balance between strategic requirements and institutional goals, today's defense budgetary environment makes balancing the two more difficult to achieve. The lack of consensus on national security policy coupled with Congress's new ability and willingness to challenge the President's national defense policy shifted the executive-legislative relationship away from Congress' Cold War practice of deferring to the President. Today, the defense budgetary environment is one characterized by partisan conflict in the absence of a consensus on national security policy. 73 Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives, 122 . 74 Banks and Straussman, "A New Imperial Presidency? Insights from U.S. Involvement in Bosnia", 216.
The dynamic biennial Congressional electoral cycle, and the prospects it brings for changes in congressional support for the President's budget, forces the Department of Defense to operate on a biennial basis. The Department of Defense must now search for and seize upon advantageous defense budgetary periods to achieve organizational goals or risk dramatic changes in funding or the elimination of specific programs altogether. To achieve institutional goals within compressed timelines DOD must prioritize its initiatives and mass resources to accelerate implementation of defense policy before the funding opportunity passes. During these periods, DOD must make every effort to delay the consideration of any initiative that competes for similar resources. DOD can secure its organizational objectives in the contemporary budgetary environment by identifying advantageous budgetary environments, prioritizing initiatives, massing resources, and then delaying the consideration of competing initiatives.
The Department of Defense's response to the call for a specialized force for stability operations was not an affront to stability operations advocates. It was a lesson in the realities of the contemporary budgetary environment. While critics understand that initiatives are always a "wedding of reasonable goals to available means," 75 today, they must also remember that the time achieve these goals is always short. Future advocates for defense initiatives must evaluate the executive-legislative relationship along with ongoing defense initiatives, and design their recommendations based upon the resources availability to DOD. Failure to address these parameters, no matter how valid the recommendation, will place the advocates of defense initiatives in direct conflict with the priorities of the Department of Defense. 
